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2017年成都理论经济学研讨会
2017-07-07 10:43:51   来源:   评论:0 点击:

一、研讨会议程研讨会将于2017年7月11日(星期二)在柳林校区格致楼J101教室举行经济学院海外院长杨再福教授致欢迎辞主讲人一: JaimieLien助理教授,香港中文大学,8:30am-9:30am主题:What Brings Consumer...
一、研讨会议程
研讨会将于2017年7月11日(星期二)在柳林校区格致楼J101教室举行
经济学院海外院长杨再福教授致欢迎辞
 
主讲人一: Jaimie Lien助理教授,香港中文大学,8:30am-9:30am
主题:What Brings Consumers Back for More? Evidence from Quantifiable Gain and Loss Experiences in Penny Auctions
主持人:雷震教授 经济学院
 
主讲人二: 郑捷助理教授,清华大学,9:30am-10:30am
主题:Multi-period Matching with Commitment
主持人:袁正教授 经济学院
 
主讲人三: 谢欢副教授,肯高迪亚大学(Concordia University),10:30 am-11:30am
主题:Persuasion Bias in Science: An Experiment
主持人:邹红教授 经济学院
 
午餐:柳园食府,11:30am-1pm
 
主讲人四:Dr Zeng Huaxia,中山大学岭南学院,1pm-2pm
主题:Random Social Choice Functions on Multidimensional Domains
主持人:杨再福教授 经济学院
 
主讲人五:张荣教授,重庆大学经管学院,2pm-3pm
主题:A growth model with welfare effect
主持人:刘定副教授 经济学院
 
主讲人六:Dr Song Yangbo,香港中文大学(深圳分校),3pm-4pm
主题:Dynamic R&D competition under uncertainty and strategic disclosure
主持人:朗旭助理教授 经济学院
 
主讲人七:Professor Ma Jinpeng, Rutgers University,4pm-5pm
主题:Convergence of averaging price processes under the centralized Walrasian auction and the decentralized double
主持人:余景生讲师 经济学院
 
主讲人八:杨再福教授,  西南财经大学经济学院, 5pm-5:40pm
主题: Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences
主持人:雷震教授 经济学院
 
晚餐:柳园食府,18:00pm-20:00pm
二、报告人和报告内容简介
主讲人一简介:Jaimie Lien, 2010年于美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校获得博士学位,现为香港中文大学商学院助理教授。主要研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学以及应用微观经济学,已在Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊发表多篇论文。
主讲内容:We utilize detailed data from penny auctions to uncover how consumers’ prior experiences predict their willingness to try a relatively new experience again. We derive the conditions on utility functions and reference point formation needed in order to account for the empirical findings. Finally, we examine the bracketing tendencies of consumers in calculating their gains and losses after repeated experiences. Consumers tend to bracket narrowly, with the above patterns strengthening as a function of the how recently the experience occurred. This is consistent with the intuition that consumers have short memories, and that a recent bad experience risks driving them away permanently, in spite of previous positive experiences.
 
主讲人二简介:郑捷, 2011年于美国华盛顿大学获得博士学位,现任清华大学经济管理学院助理教授,清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编辑(Associate Editor)。主要研究领域包括微观理论、信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学以及匹配理论,已在Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊发表多篇论文。
主讲内容:Many multi-period matching markets exhibit some level of commitment. That is, agents' ability to terminate an existing relationship is somehow restricted by cost of breakups, binding contracts or social norms. Based on real-world examples, we model matching markets with three types of commitment, defines corresponding notions of stability and examines stable mechanisms. We also specify sufficient conditions for efficiency, strategy-proofness and other properties. Moreover, we briefly discuss the case with no commitment, welfare comparisons and the extension from two periods to multiple periods.
 
主讲人三简介:谢欢, 于2008年在美国匹茨堡大学获得博士学位,现为加拿大肯高迪亚大学副教授。主要研究方向是应用微观理论、 信息经济学和实验经济学,已在American Economic Review Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory 等国际一流期刊发表论文。
主讲内容:We design an experiment to test a game theoretical model in which a Researcher who conducts randomized controlled experiments has conflicts of interest with the Evaluator of his research, such as funding agency or referees. The Researcher aims at persuading the Evaluator that the causal effect of a treatment outweighs its cost in order to justify acceptance of the treatment. The Researcher may have private information on the treatment effect of some subjects and manipulatively sample subjects based on the private information. Our main treatments vary in whether or not the Researcher possesses the private information and the possibility to manipulate sample selection. We compare the welfare of both the Researcher and Evaluator between the cases with and without the possibility for the Researcher to manipulate.
 
主讲人四简介:曾华夏, 于2016年在新加坡管理大学获得博士学位,现为中山大学岭南学院助理教授。主要研究方向是微观理论,机制设计、社会选择理论、分配问题以及拍卖理论,已在Theoretical Economics和Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊发表论文。
主讲内容:We study Random Social Choice Functions (RSCFs) in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a class of domains of multidimensional preferences, "connected+ domains". We show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF satisfying the compromise property. Next, we show that every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF defined on a connected+ domain containing sufficient many separable preferences, especially, all lexicographically separable preferences, is a generalized random dictatorship.
 
主讲人五简介:张荣,1998年7月于中国科学院系统科学研究所获系统理论博士学位,目前是重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师,入选2012年教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划。在国内外期刊上发表论文60余篇,作为负责人曾主持3项国家自然科学基金面上项目和1项国家社科基金面上项目。曾3次在美国(2004-2005)、英国(2013、2015)知名大学做访问学者。目前主要从事能源经济与经济增长等研究。
主讲内容:We develop a new model of economic growth that takes as a starting point the traditional neoclassical growth model of RCK, but incorporates wealth as a factor that affects utility. Assume that the marginal utility of consumption decreases with wealth, which is represented by a utility function with a multiplicative form. Compared with the traditional model, the new model is allowed to include some quantitative properties that are more consistent with the empirical evidences. The basic structure of the optimal solution does not change significantly although the mathematical analysis is made fairly complicated because of wealth effect. A remarkable feature of the model is that, the golden level of consumption in the Solow model could be achieved through an appropriate level of preference for wealth. Excessive patience might decrease the steady level of consumption. Quantitative properties of saving rate and convergence rate are also affected by the wealth effect.
 
主讲人六简介:宋阳波, 2015年从加州大学洛杉矶分校获得经济学博士学位,并在之后留校一年进行博士后研究工作,现在香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院任助理教授。主要研究领域是网络经济学,机制设计、契约理论以及博弈论,已在Journal of Economic Theory,Economic Theory等国际一流期刊上发表多篇论文。
主讲内容:We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm solves the first stage, it can choose whether and when to disclose the solution, which generates revenue but also benefits the opponent. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium for homogeneous firms, in which each firm will disclose the solution of the first stage if it arrives early, withhold the solution if it arrives neither too soon nor too late, and exit the competition if it has not arrived after a sufficiently long time. From a social welfare perspective, a competition is surprisingly not always optimal even without any possibility of duplicated work: in certain scenarios, it is socially more desirable to assign the R&D project to a single firm. When firms are heterogeneous, a cost advantage always leads to an
information advantage in equilibrium.
 
主讲人七简介:马金鹏教授,美国纽约州立大学石溪分校经济学博士,现任美国罗格斯大学肯顿校区经济系终身副教授,曾在以色列耶路撒冷希伯来大学理性研究中心以及美国西北大学做过博士后和访问学者的研究工作。其主要研究方向是博弈论、微观经济学、资本市场等,在国际著名期刊上发表过10余篇高水平的学术论文。
主讲内容:Using partitions, we provide a uniform framework for the centralized Walrasian auction and a decentralized dynamic double auction and prove a theorem for the convergence of averaging price processes generated by these auctions, with the weight and step sizes of the bid and the ask that are at random with unknown distributions. We also provide an error bound for constant step sizes when the weight remains at random with a unknown distribution. This paper provides insights to the question of why decentralized double auctions can reach a Walrasian equilibrium as a Walrasian auction does. Unlike the Walrasian auction, double auctions leave it the possibility of creating bubbles or crashes if the weight and the step sizes are not at a right
combination. This may explain why excess volatility is observed more often in equity market than good markets in real economy.
 

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